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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines whether foreclosed properties sold by the Department o f Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) sell for the same price as properties which have 
similar characteristics. A hedonic price model is employed to observe changes in 
sales prices related to housing characteristics within a sample o f  homes from Las 
Vegas, Nevada. The results show HUD properties and the properties o f  houses in 
close proximity to HUD-sold properties sell for significantly less than similar houses 
located elsewhere in the county. However, HUD properties do not sell for less than 
their neighbors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency within the Department 
o f Housing and Urban Development (HUD), has insured mortgages on single family 
homes since 1934. Whenever a borrower defaults on a loan and a lender forecloses a 
property, the FHA mortgage insurance provides the lender complete coverage for all 
losses. Typically, a lender begins foreclosure proceedings when either a borrower has 
missed three monthly mortgage payments or a property has been vacant for more than 
sixty days.1 After foreclosure, the lender may sell the property in a trustee sale and 
submit a claim to HUD for all losses incurred. If the lender either chooses not to sell 
the property or cannot sell the property, the FHA will pay the lender's claim and take 
possession o f the property. These properties obtained by the FHA are marketed and 
sold by HUD in a sealed-bid auction process where the highest bidder buys the 
property. If the highest bid is below the predetermined reserve price, the property is 
not sold and will return to the market at some later unspecified date.
Since H U D 's method o f selling properties, a sealed-bid auction process is 
different from traditional property disposition where buyer and seller negotiate a final
1 In some states, the laws provide an extension to the borrower before 
foreclosure. Similarly, on a federal level, the Sailors' Civil Relief Act o f 1940 
provides to borrowers in the military another extension. (HUD4191.1 Rev. Chag-5, 
Chapter 9, p. 78)
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HUD homes from selling at the efficient market price? While there are institutional 
differences between disposition methods, Fama (1970) theorized that markets are 
efficient when sales prices in a market reflect information available to all market 
participants. If the real estate market is efficient, a comparison o f HUD properties 
and properties with similar characteristics ought to reveal the same sales price, 
regardless o f  the source o f  property disposition. If prices are not the same, this may 
indicate either market inefficiency or that HUD properties have' some unique 
characteristic that distinguishes them from similar homes.
The purpose o f this thesis is to determine whether the real estate market is 
efficient with respect to HUD property sales. Specifically, it examines whether HUD  
foreclosed properties in Las Vegas, Nevada, sell for the same amount as properties 
with similar characteristics. In order to test for this, a hedonic price model is 
employed to observe changes in sales prices.
The remainder o f this thesis is organized in the following manner. Section II 
reviews the relevant literature on market efficiency and hedonic price models. The 
literature review ends with the development o f the HUD disposition hypothesis that 
ties together these two areas o f research. Section III presents the empirical model and 
section IV describes the data. Descriptive statistics and hedonic equation results are 
presented in section V. Concluding remarks are offered in section VI.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
While there exists an extensive empirical literature on market efficiency, it 
appears there are no studies that directly examine whether HUD homes sell at efficient 
market prices. In order to pursue this issue, it is important to review previous studies 
that test for market efficiency and the methods used to test for it such as the hedonic 
price model. Therefore, two relevant research areas for this thesis include (a)studies 
concerned with market efficiency and (b)studies associated with hedonic price models. 
The hedonic price model receives special attention in this literature review since it is 
often used to obtain implicit values for the characteristics o f residential property. For 
this thesis, the hedonic price model provides a method to examine whether HUD  
properties sell for a price different than that o f  non-HUD properties. The literature 
review ends with the development o f the HUD property disposition hypothesis to be 
empirically tested in the empirical section.
A. Market Efficiency
Fama (1970) introduces the efficient market hypothesis to examine whether 
information available to market participants affects stock prices.2 Market efficiency
2For an empirical example that tests whether market efficiency holds, Smith et 
al. (1992) examine whether the stock market is efficient. They find that it is highly, 
but not perfectly efficient.
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can be defined as the assimilation o f available information into the market price o f  
publicly traded corporate stock. The type o f information available to market 
participants may affect the level o f efficiency. Fama (1970) defines three levels o f  
market efficiency. (1) A market is weakly efficient if  current prices accurately reflect 
all information contained in previous price changes. (2) A market is semi-strongly 
efficient if  current prices reflect all published information as well as past price 
changes. (3) A market is strongly efficient if  the set o f  available information that 
determines current prices includes not only past price changes and public information, 
but also private information. (Smith, et al., 1992) In all three cases, if  market 
participants are unable to make excess returns based on the information set presented, 
then the market is efficient. While this concept o f market o f  efficiency provides an 
explanation for changes in stock prices, it is also provides an explanation for changes 
in real estate prices.
The empirical literature describes a relationship between information available 
to market participants and housing prices. This literature also supports the notion that 
real estate markets are weakly and semi-strongly efficient.3 For example, Gau (1984) 
examines whether the Vancouver real estate market is weakly efficient. Based on his
3Gau (1987) mentions several structural factors in the real estate market that 
might lead to market inefficiency. These factors include the indivisibility o f assets, 
noncentralized local markets, information asymmetry and high transaction costs. 
These four potential factors do not apply to the stock market where information is 
widely distributed at a low cost and many well informed investors buy and sell in a 
highly competitive environment with low transaction costs. Also, no example o f  
strong form efficiency is provided since a test for it requires private information and 
there were no studies found which showed the real estate market to be strongly 
efficient.
tests, which included an attempt to forecast future prices based only on changes in past 
prices, he concludes that the real estate market is weakly efficient. Furthermore Gau 
(1985) tests whether the Vancouver market is semi-strongly efficient. Specifically, he 
examines how quickly the current property prices reflect changes in publicly available 
information on government tax shelters and rent control policies. In order to 
accomplish this, Gau uses an arbitrage pricing model.4 No evidence o f  abnormal 
returns appear, and indeed, there is evidence that prices declined in anticipation of the 
announcements. These results indicate that the market in addition to being weakly 
efficient, is semi-strongly efficient. (Gau, 1987)
In another study o f the semi-strong efficiency hypothesis, Linneman (1986) 
uses a hedonic price model to examine whether prices o f houses in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania reflect information presented in the Annual Housing Survey, a document 
available to the general public. Once the sales prices are adjusted by transaction 
costs, the empirical results do not indicate unusual returns. Linneman (1986) 
concludes that the market is semi-strong efficient.
Using a different methodology than Linneman (1986), Case and Shiller (1989)
4 Ross (1976) formulated the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) as an alternative 
to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The basic difference between the two 
models is that the CAPM allows only one measure for risk, the variability between a 
certain stock and a market portfolio. The APT model allows for many different risk 
factors to be measured separately. This is a more appropriate model for real estate 
because in real estate there are factors beyond a market portfolio (such as tax shelter 
benefits) than can be significant in pricing changes.
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test market efficiency by constructing a repeat sales index5 for four metropolitan U.S. 
areas. Their findings also support market efficiency.
In a similar study, Guntermann and Norrbin (1991) use a hedonic model to 
examine whether the real estate market in Lubbock, Texas from 1970 - 1981 is 
efficient. Their results indicate rapid capitalization of new information into price and 
support the semi-strong efficiency hypothesis.
Finally, a study by Krantz et al. (1982) finds evidence o f some housing market 
inefficiency (in the semi-strong form) because only about sixty percent o f  property tax 
changes are capitalized in property prices. However, when property taxes are used to 
finance local government services that enhance property values, property values did 
not decline with property taxes. Therefore, the result o f Krantz et al. does not 
necessarily support a finding o f market inefficiency.
While the debate is far from over, empirical evidence tends to support semi­
strong and weak-form efficiency in the real estate market. If this is the case, one 
would expect HUD-sold properties to sell for the same price as non-HUD properties 
with similar characteristics. To test the relative HUD prices, a hedonic price model 
will be used. Thus a review o f the hedonic price model literature follows.
5The repeat sales method requires a sample o f homes sold more than once 
during a certain time frame. These homes must also have no substantial change in 
characteristics so the change in price is a pure reflection o f the change in value over 
time. One weakness in the modes is that one important housing characteristic, age, 
always changes.
B. Hedonic Price Models
A hedonic price function relates price differences o f  a heterogeneous group o f  
goods to differences in a set o f characteristics contained within those goods (Triplett, 
1987). The heterogeneous group of goods examined in this thesis are residential 
properties.
The theory supporting hedonic functions is the hedonic hypothesis, which states 
that heterogeneous goods are a bundle o f characteristics, and that selection or choice 
by consumers is based on the consumers preference for the characteristics. Each 
heterogeneous good is seen as a bundle o f characteristics which cannot be untied. For 
example, if  a consumer selects a house based on its location, it also obtains other 
characteristics such as the number of bedrooms, the condition o f the yard, the absence 
or presence o f a pool or a fireplace, and others. Even though this bundle o f  
characteristics cannot be untied, hedonic theory is based on the belief that the 
influence o f each characteristic is considered weakly separable. For example, the 
influence the presence o f  a fireplace has on the total price o f the property can be 
measured, as can the influence o f location. Since the influence o f the characteristics 
within the housing bundle are separable, variables may be introduced into a hedonic 
equation to measure the effect o f characteristics which can be attached to a property 
by externalities. These characteristics can include such things as air quality, proximity 
to earthquake faults or waste disposal sites (Nelson, 1978; Brookshire et a l., 1985; 
Thayer, Albers, Rahmatian, 1992) and, in this thesis, source o f disposition.
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The hedonic literature, in general, revolves around three concerns: simultaneity 
problems, variable selection, and correct functional form. Hedonic theory, as 
originally envisioned by Rosen (1974) described the simultaneity problem where 
housing prices were a function o f demand and supply o f housing. Many researchers 
struggled with different approaches to identify either the supply 01 demand side o f the 
equation and often solved the supply and demand equations simultaneously (Linneman, 
1986). Diamond and Smith (1985) clarified the simultaneity arguments. Their study 
found no basis for a presumption o f simultaneity between individual households and 
firms. Individuals were found to be price takers in the housing market. Also, a 
single seller's decisions are found not to have an overall effect on either prices or 
level o f  consumption. At any point in time, a buyer faces a fixed supply, as an 
increase in housing value does not cause in immediate increase in supply. With 
quantity as an exogenously determined variable, there is no simultaneity problem.
The second hedonic function concern is selecting characteristics o f the good to 
be included as explanatory variables in the equation. It is important to be careful 
when selecting characteristics since some characteristics may be highly correlated.
For example, if  housing is the "good" in question, square footage o f the building, 
number o f  bedrooms, or square footage o f the lot may all describe size. Careless 
selection can result in severe multicollinearity. Most hedonic equations include a 
variable to measure size, age6, quality, and various other characteristics such as
6D o and Gruanitski (1993) conducted a neural network analysis o f  the affect o f  
age on housing values in San Diego, California. They found that houses declined in 
value only during the first fifteen years, after that, probably due to necessary major
fireplaces, patios, and pools. Many equations include a variable to measure location. 
Location is a difficult attribute to measure and several different methods are used. 
Miller and Sklarz (1987) avoid the issue by concentrating on homogenous housing 
units, a Hawaiian condominium complex. Location is measured as distance from 
garages, from the entrance o f the building, and availability o f a view. Waddell, 
Berry, Hoch (1993), add variables that gauge actual distance from business centers, 
shopping malls, and universities. When locational variables are added, they often 
explain more than half o f  that left unexplained by traditional assessor's hedonic models 
which include only characteristics o f the home such as size and number o f  rooms.
The explanatory power o f models analyzing heterogeneous properties is lower than 
those o f homogeneous properties.
The final concern about hedonic functions considers selection o f  functional 
form. Some authors support a linear hedonic form, (Arguea and Hsiao 1993) others a 
nonlinear hedonic form (Edmonds, 1984). Other authors refine the hedonic model by 
use o f  a "paired sales" format (Meese and Wallace, 1991; Case, Pollakowski, and 
Wachter, 1991) or use o f  a priori information and an inequality restricted least squares 
estimation (Pace and Gilley, 1990). Still others depart from hedonic measures and 
support a nonparametric form (Pace, 1993), Each o f  these methods are described 
below.
Early applications o f the hedonic price function used a linear form. During the
repairs such as roofs, and major remodeling done to appeal to a new generation of  
homebuyers, the homes began to appreciate. The median age o f  homes in the San 
Diego study was 27 years, with a standard deviation o f 12.7.
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1970s researchers experimented with nonlinear forms. Edmonds (1984, p. 81)
promotes a nonlinear form,
"The move from linear to nonlinear specifications is dictated theoretically the 
Lancastrian nature o f  the problem. As long as the number o f  models available 
exceeds the number of characteristics, there will be multiple facets on the CPF. 
While each one may be linear, an approximation o f  the entire frontier would 
not b e ."
In general, Rosen (1974) envisions a hedonic consumption possibilities function (CPF) 
as mimicking a production possibilities frontier, bowed outward from the origin, a 
continuum o f choices from which a consumer can make an optimal selection based in 
his personal utility function.
Arguea and Hsiao (1993) hypothesize a linear consumption possibilities 
function based on the assumption o f  pure competition and arbitrage for the goods 
within a housing bundle. The assumption here is that each seller o f  property either 
improves the property or makes price adjustments until the property falls in line with 
similar properties along a linear consumption possibilities frontier.
Triplett (1987, p. 632) asserts that "Neither classical utility, nor production 
theory can specify the functional form." Sometimes the consumption possibilities 
frontier "...can bow in, bow out, or take the form o f straight lines (or even irregular 
shapes)." Specifically, he asserts that, goodness o f fit tests should be the final 
arbitrating factor. Most authors now estimate both linear and nonlinear equations.
While the debate between linear and nonlinear functional form is far from 
over, researchers may use statistical tests and judgement as to the appropriate form. 
This an important issue and is dealt with in the model and empirical sections.
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However, before discussing the model, it is important to tie together the efficiency and 
hedonic price literatures with the development o f the hypothesis to be tested in later 
sections.
C. The HUD Disposition Hypothesis
The lack o f  literature about HUD as a source o f  property disposition and
market efficiency motivate the hypothesis to be tested in this thesis. The hypothesis to
be tested is as follows.
Define Phud as the distribution o f  sales prices for repossessed properties sold 
by HUD and P o t h e r  be the distribution o f sales prices obtained by other 
agents. The null hypothesis to be tested in the following sections o f  this 
thesis is:
H 0: P hud =  P other
The alternative hypothesis is that the distribution o f sales prices are not 
equal.
H a‘ P hud ^  P other
The null hypothesis is closely related to semi-strong form efficiency tests, except 
there is no attempt in this thesis to forecast future prices. Rather, this thesis 
focuses on the question o f  whether HUD, as the source o f disposition, is an 
externally attached characteristic that causes these homes to be sold for less than the 
efficient market price.
III. THE MODEL
The literature supports weak and semi-strong form efficiency. If that is the 
case, then HUD should sell property at prices equivalent to non-HUD properties 
with the same characteristics. However, there might be exceptions to this 
conclusion if  HUD itself is a unique characteristic. How could HUD as the source 
o f  disposition be a unique characteristic? There are four potential ways. First, 
H UD may economize on its marketing and sales efforts. If this reduced effort 
produces a thin market for their properties, a discount may result. However, this 
discount may be a simple reflection o f the cost savings in marketing and 
advertising. Second, H UD's handling o f properties is unique. HUD properties are 
typically sold as is, with no warranty for defects. A further complication is that 
some or all o f  the utilities are turned off at the time o f sale. Any buyer who is 
uncertain about the condition o f major systems or appliances is likely to self-insure 
against defects by making a lower bid. A third problem is that HUD homes are 
vacant. Abandoned properties are a blight on the neighborhood and this might 
depress prices o f  nearby homes. If this argument is true, there will be a significant 
reduction in neighborhood prices. Fourth, HUD properties may suffer from 
adverse selection. Any prospective buyer knows that the previous owner was 
unable to maintain payments on the loan and therefore was most likely unable to 
maintain the property itself. Basically, the fact that it is a foreclosure signals that it 
is in some way a lemon. This foreclosure deficit would apply to conventional
12
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foreclosures as well as HUD foreclosures, so there is a possibility o f  a significant 
discount on any foreclosure, bank or H UD.7
Any o f these suggestions is a plausible explanation o f an observed discount 
on HUD properties. In the first case, one would expect that savvy market investors 
would take advantage o f H UD's inefficiency and thereby bid the price up to a price 
equivalent to non-HUD properties (net o f transaction costs). If HUD properties are 
sold at a discount, and this discount reflects uncertainty about the utility systems, 
appliances, or unknown defects due to the previous owner's negligence, the self- 
insurance hypothesis is supported. After accounting for all other possible 
neighborhood qualities, if one o f the neighborhood variables is significant, it 
supports the neighborhood blight hypothesis. If both conventional and FHA 
foreclosures significantly reduce property values, then the stigma o f  a foreclosure 
per se affects property value. A savvy investor could capture neighborhood effects 
only by multiple purchases.
There are three ways that HUD as the source o f disposition could affect the 
selling price o f  a home. Because it is not known, a priori which specification will 
fit sample best, each o f the three possibilities, linear, price per square foot, and log 
linear, is tested with a hedonic equation.
7 Homeowners may default on a loan either because there is negative equity 
(the home is worth less than the amount owned to the bank), perhaps due to a hidden 
defect, or the owner might default because o f financial problems. A wealth- 
maximizing homeowner with positive equity should sell the property rather than allow 
foreclosure and lose that equity. Sometimes personal problems or suboptimal behavior 
may cause individuals to deviate from wealth-maximizing behavior.
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First, being a HUD property could generate a "pure site" effect, which 
means the effect would be independent o f property size or value. In this case, the 
linear specification would be appropriate:
P =  a 0 +  cqH +  otjHN +  a 3B +  a 4BN +  PS +  yQ +  5L +  e (1)
Where:
P =  the price o f the home in dollars
H =  a dummy variable indicating HUD as the source o f  disposition.
HN =  a dummy variable indicating a HUD neighborhood. (Which includes 
the HUD house and nearby houses on the same street)
B =  a dummy variable indicating bank foreclosure sales.
BN =  a dummy variable indicating the neighborhood o f  the bank
foreclosure (which includes the foreclosed house sold by the bank 
and nearby houses on the same street sold during the same three year 
period)
S =  a measure o f size (square feet)
Q =  a vector o f quality characteristics (dummy variables indicating
presence o f  swimming pools, fireplaces, garages, covered patios, 
quality o f construction, age)
L =  a vector o f  locational characteristics (a set o f 28 dummy variables 
indicating zip code)
e =  an error term.
15
In this form, a , measures the dollar HUD discount, a 2 measures the neighborhood 
effect for a HUD foreclosure, a 3 measures the discount for a conventional 
foreclosure by a commercial bank, and a 4 measures the neighborhood effect for 
bank foreclosures. If both a , and a 3 are negative and significant, then 
foreclosures, per se, are responsible for price discounts, implying an adverse 
selection effect. I f  is negative and significant, then two possibilities exist. HUD  
foreclosures might have an adverse impact on neighborhood properties, or the HUD  
home may be located in a lower quality neighborhood. A similar neighborhood 
effect for bank foreclosures would be implied if  a 4 is negative and significant. A 
linear functional form such as equation (1), is appropriate if  the effect is a 
neighborhood blight.
If, on the other hand, the HUD effect varies with building size, but is 
independent o f  lot size, location, or quality characteristics, then the appropriate 
dependent variable is price-per-square-foot as in the following equation:
P/S =  a 0+  oqH +  ctjHN +  a 3B-f a 4BN +  PS +  yQ +  5 L +  e (2)
Where:
P/S =  Price per square foot.
In this case, the alpha coefficients measure the difference in the value o f the 
house per square foot due to foreclosure and neighborhood effects. The beta 
coefficient on S measures the relationship between the unit price and square footage 
o f  the property. This equation will give the best measure if  a buyer is worried 
about one o f  the major systems, such as air conditioning. The buyer in this case
16
will discount the structure, but not the lot.
The third possible specification is a log linear form:
InP =  a 0+  a ,H  +  o^HN +  a 3B +  a 4BN +01nS +  yQ 4- 5L4- e (3) 
Equation (3) may perform the best estimate if HUD is ineffective in its marketing 
and sales effort. The log o f the size variable is taken for ease o f  interpretation and 
to find the size elasticity o f the price.
Since it is not known, a priori, which model will be the most appropriate, 
each o f the three equations are estimated. This conforms with current practice 
where both a linear and nonlinear functional form are estimated with best fit tests to 
determine the superior model. In addition, each equation is estimated with and 
without a set o f 29 zip code indicators which proxy location. The simultaneity 
issue is resolved by assuming a fixed quantity o f houses supplied.
IV. THE DATA
All data are extracted from the Clark County Assessor's records. HUD  
identified the addresses and transfer date o f the properties they sold between 1990 
and 1993 (HUD). Two local banks identified their foreclosures during the same 
period (BANK). HUD neighborhoods and BANK neighborhoods are selected from 
the assessor's files and include homes along the same street as a HUD or BANK  
home (homes within eight street numbers higher or lower than the HUD or BANK 
address which also sold within the same 1990-1993 time period). And a random 
sample o f  homes, (MARKET) which serves as a control group for the real estate 
market, is selected from the assessor's files.
The data are restricted to single family dwellings with a sales price greater 
than zero, and greater than a gift price o f $1.00. After duplicates, building lots, 
and multiple family dwellings are eliminated: 406 HUD observations remain in the 
final sample; HUD NEIGHBORHOODS include 1,648 observations; there are 19 
commercial BANK foreclosures; BANK NEIGHBORHOODS include 69 
observations; and the RANDOM, or market sample includes 628 observations.
Some relevant descriptive statistics for all five o f the different data groups 
are shown in Table 1.
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
HUD HUD NEIGH BANK BANK NEIGH MARKET
Mean P r i c e  
St a n d a r d  Dev.
$ 7 4 , 8 2 0  
2 4 , 3 5 7
$ 7 8 , 4 2 4
3 1 , 5 3 3
$ 1 4 0 , 2 4 2  
5 5 , 1 3 8
$ 1 3 1 , 0 8 5
9 0 , 7 4 9
$ 1 1 3 , 7 7 8  
6 0 , 7 5 7
Mean SQFT 
S ta n d a r d  Dev.
1 , 4 9 3
565
1 , 4 8 6
616
2,  189 
726
1 , 9 9 1
788
1 , 7 9 7
759
Mean P/SQFT 
S ta n d a r d  Dev.
$ 5 2 . 5 8
1 5 . 0 2
5 5 . 2 3  
17.  83
64 .72  
1 7 . 1 3
6 4 . 5 1
2 4 . 7 6
6 4 . 6 7
1 9 . 8 2
According to Table 1, the mean sales price for the HUD foreclosed 
properties is 34 percent less than the market sample, 47 percent less than bank 
foreclosures, and 43 percent less than the neighbors o f  commercial bank 
foreclosures.8 HUD foreclosed properties have an average sales price o f  
approximately 5 % less than their neighbors. However, HUD properties are also 
smaller in size than either bank foreclosures or the market sample. They are 32% 
smaller than bank foreclosures and 17% smaller on average than a house sold at 
random in Las Vegas. Therefore, to make a reasonable comparison, prices are 
adjusted for size o f property. When the price-per-square-foot is considered, bank 
foreclosed properties, bank neighbors and randomly sold homes have virtually the 
same price per square foot ($64.72, $64.51, and $64.67),9 while the price per 
square foot o f HUD properties is only $50 .12 .10 Neighbors o f HUD properties
8Using a t-statistic test, the mean price o f HUD homes is not statistically 
equivalent to the mean price o f the market sample.
9Using a t-statistic test, BANK, BANK NEIGHBOR and MARKET are all 
statistically equivalent.
10The mean price-per-square-feet o f HUD homes is not statistically equivalent 
to the mean price-per-square-foot for the market sample.
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average $52.58 per square foot. HUD properties are nearly identical in size to 
their neighbors, yet sell for 6.5% less per square foot.
There are four variable categories identified by the model: source o f  
disposition, size, location, and housing characteristics. The source o f  disposition is 
identified by the following dummy variables: HUD identifies foreclosed properties 
sold by HUD; HUD NEIGHBOR identifies HUD homes and their immediate 
neighbors; BANK identifies commercial bank foreclosure sales; BANK  
NEIGHBOR identifies bank foreclosed properties and their immediate neighbors; 
and MARKET indicates the market sample.11 No attempt was made to distinguish 
between homes sold by owner and homes sold by realtors.
Size variables include: square feet of building, square feet o f  lot, number o f  
rooms, number o f  bedrooms, and number of bathrooms. Location variables are a 
set o f 29 zip codes identified by dummy variables. Quality variables include age 
(purchase date minus date built, expressed in years), pool, garage type, patio type 
(all dummy variables), quality o f construction12, and number o f  fireplaces.
Selection o f variables to be included in the final equation was based on tests 
o f  correlation coefficients. Size variables proved highly collinear. The 
multicollinearity problem was eliminated by dropping all size variables except
11 Since the list o f  HUD foreclosures is exhaustive, and the HUD and its 
neighbors were eliminated from the random sample, we know the random sample does 
not include these two groups. However, the random sample might include BANK  
foreclosures and associated Bank Neighbors.
12 Quality o f construction is a subjective variable determined by appraisers for 
the Clark County Assessors files.
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square-feet o f building.13 Age is highly correlated with zip codes, traffic nuisance 
problems and condition o f  the structure. The correlation between age and condition 
o f a home is obvious, newer homes are generally in better condition. The 
correlations between age/traffic-nuisance and age/zip code are unique to Las Vegas. 
Las Vegas grew rapidly between 1990 and 1993, and most o f that growth was in 
new planned community developments. Newer houses are generally in areas with 
planned residential streets which are not thoroughfares, but dead end offshoots from 
main arteries. Also the planned developments are often built entirely within a 
single zip code (Green Valley, Summerlin). Nevertheless, age and zip codes are 
both included to create an unrestricted equation, however, the zip codes are 
dropped to create a restricted equation. The unrestricted equation consistently 
provides a better explanation, despite some problems with multicollinearity between 
zip codes and age. Means and standard deviations for the final variables are shown 
in Table 2. This table shows general means, standard deviations, minimums and 
maximums for all property types.
13Size o f the lot and size o f the structure are also highly correlated. When 
both are used in the equation, the coefficient o f the lot variable is not significantly 
different from zero. Each were used alone in the equation and the square-feet of  
building variable was found to have greater explanatory power. In the final estimation, 
the square-feet o f  lot is omitted.
TABLE 2. GENERAL STATISTICS, ALL PROPERTY TYPES
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Variable Mean S.D Min. Max
Detached Garage.02 N/A .00 1.00
Pool .12 N/A .00 1.00
Carport .15 N/A .00 1.00
High Quality .29 N/A .00 1.00
Covered Patio .43 N/A .00 1.00
Fireplaces .57 .66 .00 4 .00
Garage .74 N/A .00 1.00
Time 1.85 1.11 .00 3 .98
Age 15.25 11.75 1.00 58 .00
P/SQFT 58.11 19.12 2.90 202.70
SQFT 1587.04 680.97 603.00 8235.00
Price 89781.00 47365.72 6000.00 750000.00
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V. RESULTS
Both restricted and unrestricted equations are estimated for each o f the three 
models introduced earlier, linear, log linear, and price per square foot. The 
unrestricted equations include four indicator variables: HUD, HUD NEIGHBORS, 
BANK REPOSSESSIONS, NEIGHBORS OF BANK REPOSSESSIONS, two size 
variables: SQUARE FOOT OF BUILDING, SQUARE FOOT SQUARED, nine 
quality variables: AGE, TIME SOLD,14 GARAGE, CARPORT, DETACHED  
GARAGE, POOL, COVERED PATIO, FIREPLACE and QUALITY15, plus 
twenty-nine locational variables (a set o f 29 ZIP CODES). The restricted form of 
each equation ignores zip codes. Table 3 reports the results o f  all six estimations.
14 A continuous variable expressed in years dated from January 1, 1990. 
15Quality is a subjective variable denoting quality o f construction.


















































































































































































































ZIP CODE F-statistle 10.77 • 7.99 • 8.72
* Indicates variable was logged for the log linear aquations.
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While the adjusted R2 o f the linear unrestricted linear appears to make that 
estimation the best fit, there is a potential problem with cross sectional data that the 
adjusted R2 does not reveal. The error variance terms associated with larger houses 
might be larger than the error variances associated with small houses, this problem 
is known as heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity will cause the regression 
estimates to be inefficient, though still unbiased and consistent. The variances o f  
the estimated parameters will not be the minimum variances and the estimated 
variances o f those estimated parameters will be biased (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
1991). A Park Test, log e2 =  a  +  piog SQFT2 +  e, was run on each o f  the six 
estimations to check for heteroscedasticity. The results o f  the Park test, are 
reported in Table 4.
Table 4. PARK TEST RESULTS FOR ALL EQUATIONS
Coefficient t-stat 2-tail sig.
Linear Model (Price, dependent variable)
Restricted: 2.19 14.34 .0000
Unrestricted: 2.25 14.69 .0000
Log linear Model (Log-Price, dependent variable)
Restricted: .31 1.95 .0504
Unrestricted: .31 1.93 .0526
Linear Model (Price-per-square-foot, dependent variable)
Restricted: -.32 1.96 .0499
Unrestricted: -.10 -.65 .5132
Only the price-per-square foot model indicates no heteroscedasticity, since its
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coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Each o f the four categories o f  
independent variables will be discussed separately.
The coefficients o f the size variables present intuitively correct conclusions, 
even though they have different signs in different equations. This difference can be 
explained by considering the dependent variable. When Price is the dependent 
variable, the coefficient is positive. This simply means as a house gets larger in 
size, it also gets larger in price. A 3000 square foot house is generally more 
expensive than a 1500 square foot house. The log linear form implies a price 
elasticity o f approximately 0.6; a ten percent increase in house size increases price 
by six percent. When Price-per-square-foot is the dependent variable, the sign o f  
the coefficient becomes negative. The intuitive explanation for this result is that 
each additional square foot o f house is not as expensive as the previous square foot. 
Colwell (1993) explained this as an engineering principle. A house that is only one 
square foot large has four feet o f exterior walls, if  the floorspace is doubled to two 
square feet, the exterior wall space does not double to 8 (2 x 4 =  8). Two square 
feet only take six feet o f exterior walls. For a builder, this is a savings in material 
and time, thus lower cost for the second square foot. A larger house is still more 
expensive than a smaller house, but each incremental increase in size does not 
cause an equal increase in price.
The quality variables are easier to interpret. In each equation, a garage, a 
pool, fireplaces, or a covered patio enhance property value. In the price-per- 
square-foot equation, a garage adds $6.78 which translates to 6% o f  the price in the
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log equation. A pool adds $6.49 per square foot (5% in the log linear equation).
A fireplace adds $3.28 per square foot (3.1 % in the log linear equation), and a 
covered patio adds $1.61 per square foot (1% in the log linear equation). In all 
equations, houses increase in value over the study period.
An increase o f one year in age decreases the price-per-square foot by $.33  
(.3% in the log linear equation). A carport, as opposed to a built-in garage, also 
consistently decreases the value o f the property. Price per square foot decreases by 
$6.77 (6% in the log linear equation). A detached garage has no impact, positive 
or negative.
The high-quality variable, which denotes the quality o f construction, has a 
consistent positive impact over all the functional forms. However, the t-statistics 
fall when zip codes are added to the regression. This may reflect the fact that 
many o f  the new homes, o f high quality, in the Las Vegas Valley are clustered into 
master planned communities each with its own zip code.
Locational variables are only considered in the unrestricted equations.
Those equations with zip code indicator variables show consistently higher adjusted 
R2 values. Six percent more explanatory power is added in the price-per-square- 
foot equation, 3% is added in the log linear and linear equations. Zip code 
variables are reported in Table 5 (See Appendices) along with a zip code map o f  
Las Vegas (Figure 1, see Appendices). The zip code F-statistics are reported on 
the bottom row o f  Table 3 as "Zip code F-statistic".
The indicator variables show source and type o f  disposition, whether it is a
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foreclosure (HUD, BANK), a neighbor o f a foreclosure (HUD NEIGHBOR,
BANK NEIGHBOR). All are compared to the market sample. In all six 
estimations, BANK and BANK NEIGHBORS coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero. Their signs are also inconsistent. The conclusion is that 
conventional bank foreclosures and neighbors o f those foreclosures do not sell at a 
price significantly different from the market sample. Thus, it cannot be said that 
foreclosures per se cause a decrease in the value o f a house.
HUD foreclosures, on the other hand, show a consistent result. The HUD  
NEIGHBOR variable, which includes both HUD homes and their neighbors, is 
negative with a significant t-statistic in all six estimations. HUD properties, and the 
houses on the same street as the HUD property sell for $3.53 per square foot, or 
3% less than random properties. The HUD variable measures only if  a HUD  
home sells for less than its similar neighbors. In all six cases, HUD homes do not 
sell for less than a similar neighborhood property. Whatever the effect, it appears 
to touch the entire neighborhood, not just HUD properties.
What do these results mean? Does it mean that HUD gets possession o f  and 
then sells homes on only the worst streets? In Figure 2, a frequency distribution of  
zip codes shows that HUD neighborhoods lay in all but five o f  the zip codes 
represented in the market sample. Those five zip codes only represent 5.3% o f the 
total market sample. HUD neighborhoods are spread throughout the city and are 
found in areas with positive zip code coefficients 60% o f the time. Across the city, 
it appears that having a HUD foreclosed property on a street is an indicator that all
houses on that street will have a lower value than comparable houses on nearby 
streets. This might imply a particular characteristic o f HUD neighborhoods.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are two alternative explanations for this neighborhood effect. One 
explanation is that abandoned HUD homes are a neighborhood blight and cause the 
value o f  neighboring properties to fall. After foreclosure, HUD properties are 
sometimes left untended for a year or more until they are sold. Until then, the 
HUD property remains vacant, utilities turned off with little or no upkeep. Along 
with the obvious problems inherent in vacancy such as unkempt grounds and 
deterioration o f the structure; vacant properties are often attractive targets for 
vandals. Any o f  these activities could lower the value o f nearby homes.
The alternative explanation is that HUD homes are, in general, simply 
located in lower quality neighborhoods. Because an FHA loan is fully insured, 
banks will often encourage or insist that borrowers who plan to purchase homes in 
lower quality neighborhoods take an FHA loan. By doing this, banks are protected 
if  a home in a deteriorating neighborhood develops negative equity and the owner 
defaults.
Unlike HUD properties, properties sold by banks do not appear to reduce 
sales prices o f  their neighbors. There may be no negative impact on sales prices 
because these sales are assigned to real estate agents who have an incentive to keep 
the property in good repair and move the property quickly from vacancy to
29
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occupancy, or it might be that these homes are located in higher quality 
neighborhoods.
These results do not indicate market inefficiency. In an efficient market, 
property in blighted or low quality neighborhoods will naturally sell for less than 
property in other neighborhoods. This research shows that there is a negative 
neighborhood effect that appears to be centered on HUD foreclosed properties. 
Future research will test this relationship between HUD homes and their neighbors. 
Tests will focus on determining whether it is H UD's abandonment o f properties 
which causes neighborhood property values to drop or whether HUD homes are 
located in lower priced neighborhoods by design. The tests will focus on causality 
and identifying quality characteristics o f the differing neighborhoods to determine if  
HUD neighborhoods differ in quality from other neighborhoods.
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VII. APPENDICES 








89014 11406.91 7.99 .058
(3.385) (4.66) (3.53)
89015 1662.05 3.01 .013
(.568) (2.03) (.928)
89030 -5660.45 -4.12 -.068
(-2.18) (-3.12) (-5.36)
89031 5365.95 4.97 .039
(.978) (1.78) ( 1 . 44)
89101 -5612.85 .62 -.007
(-1.55) (.335) (-.399)
89102 9431.47 9.22 .070
(2.47) (4.75) (3.77)
89103 6026.16 6.11 .043
(1.50) (2.99) (2.18)
89104 3458.61 5.62 .032
(.998) (3.19) (1.88)
89106 -7408.32 -6.76 -.079
(-1.72) (-3.09) (-3.78)
89107 4748.58 4.45 .034
(1.45) (2.68) (2.15)
89108 6082.97 5.91 .041
(2.28) (4.36) (3.18)
89109 22686.49 7.48 .068
(3.51) (2.27) (2.18)
89113 56361.44 33.79 .173
(6.41) (7.56) (4.01)
89115 -526.93 1.70 .009
(-.166) (1.06) (.575)
89117 24003.32 14.20 .095
(6.70) (7.79) (5.45)
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89118 -29952.21 -9.44 -.112
(-1.52) (-.939) (-1.16)
89119 2911.58 6.54 .043
(.71) (3.14) (2.13)
89120 -11542.27 -0.85 -.021
(-2.66) (-.385) (-.967)
89121 -6190.60 .44 -.006
(-1.91) (.267) (-.374)
89122 1511.72 2.62 .019
(.415) (1.41) (1.05)
89123 10828.79 9.08 .056
(2.01) (3.31) (2.11)
89128 22612.45 11.20 .074
(6.60) (6.43) (4.41)
89129 11759.97 10.63 .044
(2.16) (3.83) (1.65)
89130 3841.62 3.15 -.049
(.576) ( .927) (-1.51)
89131 31819.13 14.15 .101
(2.77) (2.42) (1.79)
89134 41612.15 24.42 .149
(7.31) (8.43) (5.34)
89139 15070.72 6.82 -4.73e04
(1.30) (1.15) (-.008)
89005 22838.61 16.17 .080
(2.83) (3.94) (2.37)
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Complete Regression Results 
TABLE 6. COMPLETE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EQUATION (1)
Depe nd en t  V a r i a b l e . . PRICE
V a r i a b l e B SE B Beta T S i g  T
HUD - 1 4 7 9 . 9 3 3 1 1 8 1 6 6 7 . 2 0 5 9 6 5 - . 0 1 1 7 7 1 - . 8 8 8 .3 7 4 8
BANK - 5 5 7 7 . 5 4 8 5 1 6 7 8 4 2 . 0 1 9 6 7 5 - . 0 1 0 4 9 9 - . 7 1 1 . 4 7 7 0
NEIGH(HUD)- 1 1 2 9 8 . 2 8 3 7 5  :1 4 8 4 . 6 6 8 8 8 1 - . 1 0 9 8 6 8 - 7 . 6 1 0 . 0000
NEIGH(BANK) 6 6 9 0 . 5 7 9 8 6 3 4 2 7 1 . 9 7 7 9 9 8 .0 2 3 7 4 4 1 . 5 6 6 .11'74
FIRE 1 1 4 5 8 . 1 5 6 5 0 4 1 1 0 6 . 2 6 7 0 1 5 .1 5 8 8 2 7 1 0 . 3 5 7 . 0 0 0 0
GARAGE 1 6 7 9 1 . 2 5 3 2 4 2 1 8 5 4 . 2 3 9 5 6 0 . 1 5 6 4 4 0 9 . 0 5 6 . 0 0 0 0
CARP - 1 0 4 4 0 . 7 2 8 8 9 1 9 3 2 . 9 7 6 2 8 2 - . 0 7 9 6 4 3 - 5 . 4 0 1 . 0 0 0 0
DGAR 2 8 3 . 0 3 3 9 2 3 4 4 6 5 . 7 9 6 5 9 0 8 . 154E-04 . 0 6 3 . 9 4 9 5
POOL 1 6 0 6 5 . 0 3 3 4 0 2 1 9 5 8 . 3 0 7 0 6 0 . 1 0 9 7 9 7 8 . 2 0 4 . 0 0 0 0
CPAT 6 0 6 6 . 2 1 3 2 7 7 1 2 5 3 . 5 5 4 3 6 0 . 0 6 3 5 0 0 4 . 8 3 9 . 0 0 0 0
HIGHQ 9 5 9 0 .  843778 1 5 6 3 .6 2 1 0 1 8 . 0 9 2 1 0 0 6 . 1 3 4 . 0 0 0 0
AGE - 5 2 4 . 2 7 1 7 3 6 6 7 . 1 6 2 5 7 7 - . 1 3 0 0 9 9 - 7 . 8 0 6 . 0 0 0 0
TIME 2 4 7 3 . 4 9 9 1 9 5 5 4 7 . 4 6 1 4 6 4 .0 5 8 0 0 8 4 . 5 1 8 . 0 0 0 0
SQFTB 9 . 1 9 2 0 3 4 2 . 9 9 7 4 2 6 . 1 3 2 1 5 2 3 . 0 6 7 .0 0 2 2
SQFTB2 .0 0 5 5 5 1 5 . 6895E-04 . 3 9 3 6 7 7 9 . 7 5 7 . 0 0 0 0
( C o n s t a n t ) 4 5 3 4 4 . 2 4 0 3 8 4 4 3 8 1 .3 6 9 9 1 8 1 0 . 3 4 9 . 0 0 0 0
M u l t i p l e  R .79227
R Sq uar e  .62 769
A d j u s t e d  R Square  .625 32
S t a n d a r d  E r r o r  2 8 9 9 2 . 9 5 6 3 5
A n a l y s i s  o f  V a r i a n c e
DF Sum o f  Sq ua res  Mean Squ are
R e g r e s s i o n  15 3 3 3 8 9 3 2 0 3 7 7 1 9 . 8 6 5 0 0  2 2 2 5 9 5 4 6 9 1 8 1 . 3 2 4
R e s i d u a l  2356  1 9 8 0 4 3 3 6 1 6 2 5 2 . 7 8 0 0 0  8 4 0 5 9 1 5 1 7 . 9 3 4 1 2
F = 2 6 4 . 8 0 8 1 3  S i g n i f  F = . 0 0 0 0
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Dependent Variable.. PRICE
V a r i a b l e B SE B Be ta T S i g  T
HUD - 1 5 9 6 . 9 6 1 9 4 1 1 5 9 5 . 4 8 4 1 9 8 - . 0 1 2 7 0 2 - 1 . 0 0 1 . 3 1 7 0
BANK - 3 9 0 7 . 1 0 4 4 4 1 7 4 9 2 . 9 5 1 5 0 9 - . 0 0 7 3 5 5 - . 5 2 1 .6 0 2 1
NEIGH(HUD) - 7 2 9 2 . 1 8 7 9 0 6 1 4 7 4 . 5 5 8 4 2 6 - . 0 7 0 9 1 2 - 4 . 9 4 5 .0 0 0 0
NEIGH(BANK) 8 1 3 1 . 0 9 2 2 6 6 4 2 0 0 . 3 4 4 9 3 9 . 028856 1 . 9 3 6 .0 5 3 0
FIRE 1 0 1 6 4 . 6 0 4 2 3 3 1 0 9 6 . 1 2 3 7 7 4 .1 4 0 8 9 7 9 . 2 7 3 .0 0 0 0
GARAGE 1 3 7 2 1 . 5 5 1 1 4 9 1 8 1 5 . 2 2 2 1 7 2 . 127841 7 . 5 5 9 .0 0 0 0
CARP - 9 2 2 5 . 3 6 4 5 5 8 1 9 0 2 . 2 3 3 7 5 9 - . 0 7 0 3 7 2 - 4 . 8 5 0 .0 0 0 0
DGAR 4 1 3 5 . 0 8 1 7 3 8 4 3 1 5 . 6 2 9 5 0 4 .0 1 1 9 1 2 . 958 . 3 3 8 1
POOL 1 5 2 6 4 . 5 0 4 3 3 9 1 8 9 5 . 1 6 3 6 1 3 . 1 0 4 3 2 6 8 . 0 5 4 . 0 0 0 0
CPAT 4 2 7 6 . 6 7 2 8 0 8 1 2 3 3 . 4 6 1 5 3 3 .0 4 4 7 6 7 3 . 4 6 7 . 0 0 0 5
HIGHQ 7 7 6 2 . 0 6 3 7 8 3 1 8 1 2 . 8 6 6 3 9 5 . 0 7 4 5 3 9 4 . 2 8 2 . 0 0 0 0
AGE - 3 4 0 . 4 6 0 9 2 6 7 5 . 6 4 2 2 8 6 - . 0 8 4 4 8 6 - 4 . 5 0 1 . 0 0 0 0
TIME 2 2 9 2 . 2 9 8 1 1 7 5 2 7 . 8 3 1 2 8 3 .0 5 3 7 5 9 4 . 3 4 3 . 0 0 0 0
SQFTB 7 . 5 5 1 4 4 6 2 . 9 3 1 7 4 8 . 1 0 8 5 6 6 2 . 5 7 6 .0 1 0 1
SQFTB2 .0 0 5 8 4 9 5 . 5400E-04 . 4 1 4 7 9 0 1 0 . 5 5 7 .0 0 0 0
Z014 1 1 4 0 6 . 9 1 2 4 4 1 3 3 7 0 . 2 3 6 6 0 5 .0 5 2 9 9 8 3 . 3 8 5 .0 0 0 7
Z015 1 6 6 2 . 0 4 5 6 3 7 2 9 2 4 . 6 9 6 3 9 1 .0 0 8 4 6 2 .568 . 5 6 9 9
Z030 - 5 6 6 0 . 4 5 2 5 3 3 2 5 9 5 . 1 3 2 4 4 8 - . 0 4 0 1 2 3 - 2 . 1 8 1 . 0 2 9 3
Z031 5 3 6 5 . 9 4 9 5 1 0 5 4 8 6 . 1 2 1 6 7 3 .0 1 2 6 6 2 .978 .3 2 8 1
Z101 - 5 6 1 2 . 8 4 5 0 4 2 3 6 2 1 . 4 6 7 3 3 0 - . 0 2 3 1 2 3 - 1 . 5 5 0 .1 2 1 3
Z102 9 4 3 1 . 4 6 9 2 3 7 3 8 1 5 . 6 2 6 6 2 0 .0 3 5 9 5 4 2 . 4 7 2 .0 1 3 5
Z103 6 0 2 6 . 1 5 9 1 0 7 4 0 1 8 . 7 4 9 0 6 9 .0 1 9 9 8 1 1 . 5 0 0 .1 3 3 9
Z104 3 4 5 8 . 6 1 0 5 8 5 3 4 6 4 . 4 2 8 1 8 1 .0 1 4 3 2 0 .99 8 .3 1 8 2
Z106 - 7 4 0 8 . 3 2 4 8 0 7 4 3 0 5 . 8 3 5 0 4 9 - . 0 2 3 7 5 2 - 1 . 7 2 1 . 0 8 5 5
Z107 4 7 4 8 . 5 7 9 7 3 0 3 2 6 8 . 6 3 8 5 4 7 . 0 2 2 0 6 3 1 . 4 5 3 .1 4 6 4
Z108 6 0 8 2 . 9 6 8 2 7 0 2 6 6 5 . 4 2 4 1 7 7 . 0 3 5 7 7 3 2 . 2 8 2 . 0 2 2 6
Z109 2 2 6 8 6 . 4 8 8 4 0 9 6 4 6 8 . 1 7 9 1 6 0 .0 4 5 9 2 2 3 . 5 0 7 . 0 0 0 5
Z113 5 6 3 6 1 . 4 3 8 7 3 0 8 7 8 8 . 8 2 2 5 6 3 .0 8 0 8 6 1 6 . 4 1 3 . 0 0 0 0
Z115 - 5 2 6 . 9 2 6 4 2 8 3 1 6 5 . 5 9 5 3 4 1 - . 0 0 2 3 7 0 - . 1 6 6 .8 6 7 8
Z117 2 4 0 0 3 . 3 2 0 1 4 3 3 5 8 4 . 6 8 2 4 4 8 . 1 0 1 3 6 8 6 . 6 9 6 .0 0 0 0
Z118 - 2 9 9 5 2 . 2 1 2 3 2 1 9 7 5 8 . 7 4 7 3 8 - . 0 1 8 3 5 8 - 1 . 5 1 6 .1 2 9 7
Z119 2 9 1 1 . 5 7 7 8 4 8 4 0 9 7 . 6 9 3 3 8 6 . 0 0 9 9 6 2 .7 11 .4 7 7 4
Z120 - 1 1 5 4 2 . 2 7 1 8 3 4 3 4 4 . 9 4 9 7 6 9 - . 0 3 7 6 4 4 - 2 . 6 5 6 .0 0 7 9
Z121 - 6 1 9 0 . 5 9 9 9 7 3 3 2 5 0 . 2 6 9 6 5 7 - . 0 2 9 6 4 5 - 1 . 9 0 5 . 0 5 6 9
Z122 1 5 1 1 . 7 1 4 6 4 5 3 6 4 3 . 4 4 6 1 8 6 .0 0 5 6 2 2 .4 15 .6 7 8 2
Z123 1 0 8 2 8 . 7 8 8 2 3 2 5 3 9 9 . 6 8 8 1 2 8 . 026380 2 . 0 0 5 . 0 4 5 0
Z128 2 2 6 1 2 . 4 5 2 5 5 7 3 4 2 5 . 9 2 1 5 5 9 . 0 9 4 5 6 6 6 . 6 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
Z129 1 1 7 5 9 . 9 7 0 9 6 7 5 4 5 2 . 0 9 7 4 5 6 .0 2 8 6 4 9 2 . 1 5 7 .0 3 1 1
Z130 3 8 4 1 . 6 2 1 6 0 1 6 6 7 2 . 8 8 5 7 5 5 .0 0 7 2 3 1 .5 7 6 .5 6 4 9
Z131 3 1 8 1 9 . 1 3 0 0 6 3 1 1 5 0 0 . 8 6 0 4 1 . 0 3 3 7 5 1 2 . 7 6 7 .0 0 5 7
Z134 4 1 6 1 2 . 1 5 2 2 2 5 5 6 9 1 . 4 2 9 9 3 1 . 0 9 4 9 0 5 7 . 3 1 1 . 0 0 0 0
Z139 1 5 0 7 0 . 7 2 3 7 1 8 1 1 6 1 8 . 8 9 7 7 6 . 0 1 5 9 8 6 1 . 2 9 7 .1 9 4 7
Z005 2 2 8 3 8 . 6 0 8 0 5 7 8 0 7 0 . 3 0 5 4 3 5 . 0 3 5 6 0 6 2 . 8 3 0 .0 0 4 7
( C o n s t a n t ) 4 1 9 9 7 . 0 7 0 4 2 4 4 4 2 7 . 8 8 2 6 5 8 9 . 4 8 5 .0 0 0 0
M u l t i p l e  R . 8 1 5 4 7
R Square  . 6 6 4 9 8
A d j u s t e d  R Square  . 6 5 8 8 0
S t a n d a r d  E rror  2 7 6 6 7 . 5 7 7 1 2
A n a l y s i s  o f  V a r i a n c e
DF Sum o f  S q u ar es  Mean Square
R e g r e s s i o n  43 3 5 3 7 2 9 3 7 0 4 1 9 6 . 5 1 0 0 0  8 2 2 6 2 6 4 4 2 8 3 . 6 3 9 8
R e s i d u a l  2328 1 7 8 2 0 7 1 9 4 9 7 7 6 . 1 3 5 0 0  7654 9 4 8 2 3 . 7 8 7 0 0
F = 1 0 7 . 4 6 3 3 6  S i g n i f  F = . 0 0 0 0
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TABLE 7. COMPLETE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EQUATION (2)
Depe nd ent  V a r i a b l e . .  PSQFTB
V a r i a b l e B SE B Be ta T S i g  T
HUD - 1 . 3 0 8 0 8 9 .8 5 5 1 7 7 - . 0 2 5 7 7 3 - 1 . 5 3 0 . 1262
BANK - . 8 6 9 9 0 7 4 . 0 2 2 4 8 9 - . 0 0 4 0 5 6 - . 2 1 6 . 8288
NEIGH(HUD) - 5 . 5 8 8 8 1 0 .7 615 47 - . 1 3 4 6 2 7 - 7 . 3 3 9 . 0 0 0 0
NEIGH(BANK) .4 0 9 7 2 7 2 . 1 9 1 2 7 0 .0 0 3 6 0 2 .187 .8 5 1 7
FIRE 4 . 1 6 3 0 4 0 . 5 6 7 4 4 9 . 142947 7 . 3 3 6 .0 0 0 0
GARAGE 9 . 1 6 9 3 3 0 . 9 5 1 1 1 5 . 2 1 1 6 2 0 9.  641 .0 0 0 0
CARP - 7 . 7 9 8 9 2 0 .9 9 1 5 0 2 - . 1 4 7 3 6 9 - 7 . 8 6 6 .0 0 0 0
DGAR - 2 . 1 5 1 3 8 3 2 . 2 9 0 6 8 8 - . 0 1 5 3 5 3 - . 9 3 9 .3 4 7 7
POOL 6 . 9 9 3 5 0 6 1 . 0 0 4 4 9 5 . 118402 6.  962 .0 0 0 0
CPAT 2 . 9 0 6 4 6 1 .6 4 2 9 9 9 . 0 7 5 3 6 6 4 . 5 2 0 . 0 0 0 0
HIGHQ 3 . 2 9 4 2 5 0 . 8 0 2 0 4 5 .0 7 8 3 6 4 4 . 1 0 7 .0 0 0 0
AGE - . 4 1 3 1 5 2 . 0 3 4 4 5 0 - . 2 5 3 9 6 8 - 1 1 . 9 9 3 .0 0 0 0
TIME 1 . 5 9 8 9 5 5 . 2 8 0 8 1 5 . 0 9 2 8 9 0 5 . 6 9 4 .0 0 0 0
SQFTB - . 0 2 3 2 1 8 .0 0 1 5 3 8 - . 8 2 6 8 7 7 - 1 5 . 1 0 1 .0 0 0 0
SQFTB2 2 . 82774E- 06 2 . 9184E-07 .4 9 6 7 7 3 9.  689 .0 0 0 0
( C o n s t a n t ) 8 3 . 0 4 2 7 1 6 2 . 2 4 7 3 8 2 3 6 . 9 5 1 .0 00 0
M u l t i p l e  R . 6 3 1 5 9
R Sq ua re  . 3 9 8 9 1
A d j u s t e d  R Square  .39 508
S t a n d a r d  E rror  1 4 . 8 7 1 6 6
A n a l y s i s  o f  V a r i a n c e
DF
R e g r e s s i o n  15
R e s i d u a l  2356
Sum o f  Squares  
3 4 5 8 0 1 . 0 0 5 0 0  
5 2 1 0 6 7 . 7 8 6 3 8
Mean Sq uar e  
2 3 0 5 3 . 4 0 0 3 3  
2 2 1 . 1 6 6 2 9
F = 1 0 4 . 2 3 5 6 0 S i g n i f  F = .0 0 0 0
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Dependent Variable.. PSQFTB
V a r i a b l e B SE B Beta T S i g  T
HUD - 1 . 2 5 7 0 6 8 .8 1 1 5 3 6 - . 0 2 4 7 6 7 - 1 . 5 4 9 .1 2 1 5
BANK - . 3 0 0 5 4 0 3 . 8 1 1 2 5 5 - . 0 0 1 4 0 1 - . 0 7 9 .9 3 7 2
NEIGH(HUD) - 3 . 5 2 8 2 0 7 .7 5 0 0 2 7 - . 0 8 4 9 9 0 - 4 . 7 0 4 . 0 0 0 0
NEIGH(BANK) 1 . 1 9 4 7 6 1 2 . 1 3 6 4 8 6 .0 1 0 5 0 3 .5 5 9 .5 7 6 1
FIRE 3 . 2 7 9 5 0 8 .5 5753 8 .1 1 2 6 0 9 5 . 8 8 2 . 0 0 0 0
GARAGE 6 . 7 7 5 7 0 1 .92330 4 .1 5 6 3 7 7 7 . 3 3 9 . 0 0 0 0
CARP - 6 . 7 7 2 4 9 5 .9 6 7 5 6 2 - . 1 2 7 9 7 4 - 7 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0
DGAR - . 7 2 9 7 9 3 2 . 1 9 5 1 2 5 - . 0 0 5 2 0 8 - . 3 3 2 . 7 3 9 6
POOL 6 .4 8 9 1 0 4 .9 6 3 9 6 6 .1 0 9 8 6 2 6 . 7 3 2 . 0 0 0 0
CPAT 1 .6 0 6 4 1 9 .627 39 4 .0 4 1 6 5 5 2 . 5 6 0 . 0 1 0 5
HIGHQ 1 . 1 5 5 3 4 5 . 9 2 2 1 0 6 .0 2 7 4 8 3 1 . 2 5 3 .2 1 0 4
AGE - . 3 3 3 5 0 4 .0 3 8 4 7 5 - . 2 0 5 0 0 8 - 8 . 6 6 8 . 0 0 0 0
TIME 1 .5 6 5 3 9 6 .2 6 8 4 7 9 .0 9 0 9 4 0 5 . 8 3 1 . 0 0 0 0
SQFTB - . 0 2 4 2 5 9 .0 01 491 - . 8 6 3 9 5 4 - 1 6 . 2 6 8 . 0 0 0 0
SQFTB2 3 . 0467 7E- 06 2 . 8179E-07 .535 25 4 1 0 . 8 1 2 . 0 0 0 0
Z014 7 . 9 9 0 9 0 6 1 . 7 1 4 2 5 5 .0 9 1 9 6 9 4 . 6 6 1 . 0 0 0 0
Z015 3 . 0 1 2 5 2 1 1 . 4 8 7 6 3 3 .0 3 7 9 9 4 2 . 0 2 5 . 0 4 3 0
Z030 - 4 . 1 2 2 0 7 6 1 . 3 2 0 0 0 2 - . 0 7 2 3 7 9 - 3 . 1 2 3 .0 0 1 8
Z031 4 . 9 6 9 7 5 7 2 . 7 9 0 4 9 0 .0 2 9 0 5 1 1 . 7 8 1 . 0 7 5 0
Z101 .6 1 7 5 5 5 1 . 8 4 2 0 4 2 .0 0 6 3 0 2 .3 3 5 . 7 3 7 5
Z102 9 . 2 2 3 8 9 1 1 . 9 4 0 8 0 1 .0 8 7 1 0 3 4 . 7 5 3 . 0 0 0 0
Z103 6 . 1 1 2 8 5 4 2 . 0 4 4 1 1 8 .0 5 0 2 0 9 2 . 9 9 0 .0 0 2 8
Z104 5 . 6 2 3 7 0 4 1 . 7 6 2 1 6 5 .0 5 7 6 8 1 3 . 1 9 1 . 0 0 1 4
Z106 - 6 . 7 5 5 7 5 0 2 . 1 9 0 1 4 3 - . 0 5 3 6 5 4 - 3 . 0 8 5 . 0 0 2 1
Z107 4 . 4 4 9 5 2 6 1 . 6 6 2 5 7 8 .0 5 1 2 1 1 2 . 6 7 6 . 0 0 7 5
Z108 5 . 9 0 6 5 0 1 1 . 3 5 5 7 5 6 .0 8 6 0 4 5 4 .3 5 7 . 0 0 0 0
Z109 7 . 4 7 9 6 4 4 3 . 2 9 0 0 0 9 .0 3 7 5 0 5 2 . 2 7 3 . 0 2 3 1
Z113 3 3 . 7 9 1 0 5 1 4 . 4 7 0 3 9 4 .1 2 0 0 9 1 7 . 5 5 9 . 0 0 0 0
Z115 1 . 7 0 1 5 1 8 1 . 6 1 0 1 6 5 .0 1 8 9 5 8 1 . 0 5 7 .2 9 0 7
Z117 1 4 .1 9 5 1 4 8 1 . 8 2 3 3 3 2 .1 4 8 4 9 9 7 . 7 8 5 . 0 0 0 0
Z118 - 9 . 4 3 4 9 7 6 1 0 . 0 5 0 1 9 5 - . 0 1 4 3 2 5 - . 9 3 9 . 3 4 7 9
Z119 6 . 5 3 8 4 6 4 2 . 0 8 4 2 7 3 .0 5 5 4 1 8 3 . 1 3 7 . 0 0 1 7
Z120 - . 8 5 1 5 0 2 2 . 2 1 0 0 3 8 - . 0 0 6 8 7 9 - . 3 8 5 . 7 0 0 1
Z121 .4 4 0 6 3 1 1 . 6 5 3 2 3 5 .0 0 5 2 2 7 . 2 6 7 . 7 8 9 9
Z122 2 . 6 2 1 3 2 8 1 . 8 5 3 2 2 2 . 02 41 48 1 . 4 1 4 .1 5 7 4
Z123 9 . 0 7 6 6 0 7 2 . 7 4 6 5 2 6 . 05 47 74 3 . 3 0 5 . 0 0 1 0
Z128 1 1 . 1 9 8 7 5 5 1 . 7 4 2 5 7 9 .1 1 6 0 1 5 6 . 4 2 7 . 0 0 0 0
Z129 1 0 . 6 3 1 8 6 8 2 .7 7 3 1 8 4 .0 6 4 1 5 9 3 . 8 3 4 . 0 0 0 1
Z130 3 . 1 4 7 2 7 0 3 . 3 9 4 1 3 2 .0 1 4 6 7 5 .9 2 7 . 3 5 3 9
Z131 1 4 . 1 4 9 8 6 0 5 . 8 4 9 8 5 9 .0 3 7 1 7 9 2 . 4 1 9 . 0 1 5 6
Z134 2 4 . 4 1 1 1 7 9 2 . 8 9 4 9 1 9 .1 3 7 9 1 5 8 . 4 3 2 . 0 0 0 0
Z139 6 . 8 1 6 2 6 7 5 .9 0 9 8 9 8 .0 1 7 9 1 0 1 . 1 5 3 . 2 4 8 9
Z005 1 6 .1 6 9 6 1 2 4 . 1 0 4 9 2 3 .0 6 2 4 4 6 3.  939 . 0 0 0 1
( C o n s t a n t ) 8 1 .0 0 6 9 7 4 2 . 2 5 2 2 2 2 3 5 . 9 6 8 . 0000
M u l t i p l e  R . 6 8 4 2 0
R Sq ua re  .46 8 1 3
A d j u s t e d  R Sq uar e  .45 8 3 1
S t a n d a r d  E rror  1 4 .0 7 2 9 8




R e g r e s s i o n
R e s i d u a l
F = 4 7 . 6 5 2 2 0
Sum o f  S q u ar es  
4 0 5 8 1 0 . 9 8 5 7 8  
4 6 1 0 5 7 . 8 0 5 6 1
Mean Squ are  
9 4 3 7 . 4 6 4 7 9  
1 9 8 . 0 4 8 8 9
S i g n i f  F = . 0 0 0 0
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TABLE 8. COMPLETE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EQUATION (3)
Dependent  V a r i a b l e . .  LPRICE 
----------------------------------  V a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  E q u a t i o n
V a r i a b l e  B SE B Be ta T S i g  T
HUD - 4 . 96189E-04 .0080 97 - 9 . 033E-04 - . 0 6 1 .9 5 1 1
BANK .0 2 5 2 3 2 .038 10 4 . 0 1 0 8 7 1 .662 .5 0 7 9
NEIGH(HUD) - . 0 4 1 4 1 6 .007 20 8 - . 0 9 2 1 8 2 - 5 . 7 4 6 . 0000
NEIGH(BANK) - . 0 1 8 3 9 7 . 020758 - . 0 1 4 9 4 3 - . 8 8 6 . 3 7 5 6
FIRE .0 4 0 0 1 3 .005 388 .1 2 6 9 4 9 7 . 4 2 6 . 0 0 0 0
GARAGE .0 8 1 7 3 8 .0 08 917 .1 74 30 4 9 . 1 6 7 . 0 0 0 0
CARP - . 0 6 9 9 5 6 .0 0 9 3 5 6 - . 1 2 2 1 4 1 - 7 . 4 7 7 . 0 0 0 0
DGAR - . 0 1 0 3 8 8 .0 21 67 1 - . 0 0 6 8 5 0 - . 4 7 9 . 6 3 1 7
POOL .0 5 7 6 4 8 .009 522 . 0 9 0 1 8 0 6 . 0 5 4 . 0 0 0 0
CPAT .0 21 848 .0 06 07 7 . 0 5 2 3 4 6 3 . 5 9 5 .0 0 0 3
HIGHQ .0 2 7 3 2 7 .007593 .0 6 0 0 6 3 3 . 5 9 9 .0 0 0 3
AGE - . 0 0 3 3 6 1 3 . 2528E-04 - . 1 9 0 8 7 0 - 1 0 . 3 3 1 . 0 0 0 0
TIME .0 1 3 8 2 2 .0 0 2 6 5 9 .0 7 4 1 9 3 5 . 1 9 9 . 0 0 0 0
LSQFTB .5 5 8 0 8 0 .0 23 41 2 .4 1 9 0 0 5 2 3 . 8 3 7 .0 0 0 0
(C o n s t a n t )  3 . 0 9 4 5 9 9 .0 77 59 7 3 9 . 8 8 0 . 0 0 0 0
M u l t i p l e  R .7 343 2
R Square  .5 3923
A d j u s t e d  R Square  . 5 36 49
S ta n d a r d  E rror  .1 40 89
A n a l y s i s  o f  V a r i a n c e
DF
R e g r e s s i o n  14
R e s i d u a l  2357
Sum o f  Sq uar es  
5 4 . 7 5 2 4 2  
4 6 . 7 8 6 1 9
Mean Square  
3 . 9 1 0 8 9  
. 0 1 9 8 5
F = 1 9 7 . 0 2 3 1 0 S i g n i f  F = .0 0 0 0
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Dependent Variable.. LPRICE
V a r i a b l e B SE B Beta T S i g  T
HUD 2. 89188E-04 .007802 5 . 265E-04 . 037 . 9704
BANK . 0 2 9 5 7 3 .036 652 .0 1 2 7 4 1 . 807 . 4198
NEIGH(HUD) - . 0 2 7 7 9 8 .007 209 - . 0 6 1 8 7 1 - 3 . 8 5 6 . 0001
NEIGH(BANK) - . 0 1 2 4 6 5 .02 05 45 - . 0 1 0 1 2 5 - . 6 0 7 .5 4 4 1
FIRE .0 3 0 5 8 9 .005 371 .0 9 7 0 4 7 5.  695 . 0000
GARAGE .0 59 69 2 .008 804 .1 2 7 2 9 1 6 . 7 8 0 . 0000
CARP - . 0 5 9 9 2 1 . 00 92 96 - . 1 0 4 6 1 9 - 6 . 4 4 6 .0 0 0 0
DGAR - 4 . 05457E-04 .02 10 85 - 2 . 673E-04 - . 0 1 9 .9 8 4 7
POOL . 049279 . 00 92 76 .0 7 7 0 8 8 5.  313 . 0000
CPAT .0 1 1 1 4 3 .00 60 25 . 026698 1 . 8 4 9 . 0645
HIGH Q .0 11694 .0 08 86 0 . 0 2 5 7 0 3 1 . 3 2 0 . 1 8 7 0
AGE - . 0 0 2 6 4 1 3 . 6865E-04 - . 1 5 0 0 2 4 - 7 . 1 6 5 . 0 0 0 0
TIME . 0 1 3 7 2 9 .002 581 . 0 7 3 6 9 3 5.  320 . 0 0 0 0
LSQFTB . 5 7 0 1 3 5 .023 593 . 4 2 8 0 5 7 2 4 . 1 6 5 . 0000
Z014 .0 5 8 1 4 7 .016 472 .0 6 1 8 3 5 3 . 5 3 0 .0 0 0 4
Z015 .0 1 3 2 8 3 .014 307 .0 1 5 4 7 9 . 928 .3 5 3 3
Z030 - . 0 6 7 9 0 6 .012 667 - . 1 1 0 1 7 1 - 5 . 3 6 1 . 0 0 0 0
Z031 .0 38 55 7 .02 68 12 .0 2 0 8 2 5 1 . 4 3 8 . 1 5 0 6
Z101 - . 0 0 7 0 6 0 .017 702 - . 0 0 6 6 5 7 - . 3 9 9 . 6901
Z102 .0 7 0 3 8 5 .018 667 .0 6 1 4 1 3 3 . 7 7 1 .0 0 0 2
Z103 .0 42 89 8 .019654 . 0 3 2 5 5 6 2 . 1 8 3 .0 2 9 2
Z104 .0 3 1 8 8 5 .0 16946 .0 3 0 2 1 7 1.  882 . 0 6 0 0
Z106 - . 0 7 9 6 4 7 .0210 81 - . 0 5 8 4 4 6 - 3 . 7 7 8 .0 0 0 2
Z107 .0 3 4 3 2 3 .01 59 99 . 0 3 6 5 0 0 2 . 1 4 5 . 0 3 2 0
Z108 . 0 4 1 4 3 6 .013 037 .0 5 5 7 7 4 3 . 1 7 8 . 0015
Z109 . 0 6 8 2 9 1 .03 13 79 . 0 3 1 6 4 0 2 . 1 7 6 . 0296
Z113 .1 7 2 5 4 3 .04 29 86 .0 5 6 6 5 9 4.  014 . 0001
Z115 . 0 0 8 8 9 3 .01 54 80 . 0 0 9 1 5 6 . 57 5 .5 6 5 7
Z117 .0 9 5 4 3 3 . 01 75 26 .0 9 2 2 4 5 5 . 4 4 5 . 0000
Z118 - . 1 1 2 0 2 4 .096 658 - . 0 1 5 7 1 5 - 1 . 1 5 9 . 2 4 6 6
Z119 .0 42 68 2 . 02 00 46 .0 3 3 4 2 6 2 .  129 . 0333
Z120 - . 0 2 0 5 4 2 .021 242 - . 0 1 5 3 3 5 - . 9 6 7 . 3336
Z121 - . 0 0 5 9 5 0 .015904 - . 0 0 6 5 2 2 - . 3 7 4 .7 0 8 3
Z122 .0 1 8 7 5 2 .0178 23 .0 1 5 9 6 1 1 . 0 5 2 . 2 9 2 9
Z123 .0 5 5 5 7 0 .026404 .0 3 0 9 8 5 2 . 1 0 5 .0 3 5 4
Z128 .0 7 3 8 9 1 .016 75 3 .0 7 0 7 2 8 4 . 4 1 1 . 0000
Z129 . 0 4 4 0 0 6 .026664 .0 2 4 5 3 7 1.  650 .0 9 9 0
Z130 - . 0 4 9 1 1 7 .032632 - . 0 2 1 1 6 2 - 1 . 5 0 5 . 1324
Z131 . 1 0 0 5 3 6 .056 22 6 .0 2 4 4 0 8 1 . 7 8 8 .0 7 3 9
Z134 .148584 .027 83 5 . 0 7 7 5 6 3 5.  338 .0 0 0 0
Z139 - 4 . 73177E-04 .05 68 25 - 1 . 149E-04 - . 0 0 8 . 9934
Z005 .0 80 318 .03 94 55 .0 2 8 6 6 0 2 . 0 3 6 .0 4 1 9
( C o n s t a n t ) 3 . 0 4 9 4 1 0 .07 73 51 3 9 . 4 2 3 .0 0 0 0
M u l t i p l e  R .76 14 4
R Squ are  .57 97 8
A d j u s t e d  R Square . 5 7221
S t a n d a r d  E rror  . 1 3 5 3 5
A n a l y s i s  o f  V a r i a n c e
DF Sum o f  Sq uar es  Mean Square
R e g r e s s i o n  42 5 8 . 8 7 0 4 0  1 . 4 0 1 6 8
R e s i d u a l  2329 4 2 . 6 6 8 2 1  .01 8 3 2
F = 7 6 . 5 0 9 0 3  S i g n i f  F = .0 0 0 0
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TABLE 9. COMPLETE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DIFFERENT
PROPERTY CLASSIFICATIONS 
G E N E R A L  S T A T I S T I C S ,  A L L  P R O P E R T Y  T Y P E S
Valid
Variable Mean Std Dev Kurtosis S.E. Kurt Minimum Maximum N
DGAR . 0 2 . 14 4 7 . 8 3 . 10 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
NEIGH(BANK) . 0 3 . 1 7 2 9 . 4 7 . 10 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
POOL . 1 2 . 3 2 3 . 5 6 . 1 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
CARP . 1 5 . 3 6 1.  67 . 10 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
HUD . 1 7 . 3 8 1.  05 . 10 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
HIGHQ . 2 9 . 4 5 - 1 . 1 6 . 1 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
CPAT . 4 3 . 5 0 - 1 .  93 . 10 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
FIRE . 5 7 . 6 6 4 . 47 . 10 . 0 0 4 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
NEIGH(HUD) . 6 9 . 4 6 - 1 . 2 8 . 1 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
GARAGE . 7 4 . 4 4 - . 8 6 . 10 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
FLORS 1 . 2 4 . 4 3 - . 5 6 . 10 1 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 2 2 1 9
TIME 1 . 8 5 1 . 1 1 - 1 . 3 1 . 10 . 0 0 3 . 9 8 2 3 7 2
AGE 1 5 . 2 5 1 1 . 7 5 - . 2 6 . 10 1 58 2 3 7 2
PSQFTB 5 8 . 1 1 1 9 . 1 2 2 . 7 2 . 10 2 . 9 0 2 0 2 . 7 0 2 3 7 2
SQFTB 1 5 8 7 . 0 4 6 8 0 . 9 7 8 . 3 5 . 10 6 0 3 . 0 0 8 2 3 5 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
PRICE 8 9 7 1 8 . 5 8  4 7 3 6 5 . 7 2  
HU D  N E I G H B O R H O O D S :
2 9 .  64 . 10 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 7 5 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 3 7 2
Valid
Variable Mean Std Dev Kurtosis S.E. Kurt Minimum Maximum N
NEIGH (BANK) . 0 0 . 0 0 . . 0 0 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
DGAR . 0 2 . 1 3 5 2 . 0 1 ! 12 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
POOL . 0 9 . 2 9 6 . 0 4 . 12 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
CARP . 1 9 . 3 9 . 6 0 . 1 2 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
HIGHQ . 2 1 . 4 0 . 14 . 12 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
HUD . 2 5 . 4 3 - . 6 1 . 12 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
CPAT . 4 2 . 4 9 - 1 . 8 8 . 12 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
FIRE . 4 7 . 6 2 7 . 4 5 . 1 2 . 0 0 4 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
GARAGE . 6 9 . 4 6 - 1 . 3 0 . 12 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
NEIGH (HUD) 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
FLORS 1 . 2 1 . 4 1 . 0 4 . 13 1 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 1 5 2 5
TIME 1 . 8 3 1 . 1 2 - 1 . 3 5 . 12 . 0 0 3 . 7 5 1 6 4 8
AGE 1 6 . 8 8 1 1 . 4 7 - . 4 4 . 12 1 58 1 6 4 8
PSQFTB 5 5 . 2 3 1 7 . 8 3 4 . 2 6 . 12 2 .  90 2 0 2 . 7 0 1 6 4 8
SQFTB 1 4 8 6 . 5 2 6 1 6 . 1 9 8 . 2 8 . 12 6 0 3 . 0 0 7 1 4 4 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
PRI CE 7 8 4 2 4 . 2 2  3 1 5 3 3 . 4 8  
B A N K  N E I G H B O R H O O D S
1 2 . 4 5 . 12 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 6 4 8
Valid
Variable Mean Std Dev Kurtosis S.E. Kurt Minimum Maximum N
HUD . 0 0 . 0 0 . . 00 . 0 0 69
NEIGH (HUD) . 0 0 . 00 , . 0 0 . 0 0 69
DGAR . 0 1 . 12 6 9 . 0 0 .’ 57 . 00 1 . 0 0 69
CARP . 12 . 32 4 . 14 . 57 . 00 1 . 0 0 69
POOL . 2 8 . 4 5 - . 9 7 . 5 7 . 00 1 . 0 0 69
HIGHQ . 5 8 . 5 0 - 1 .  95 . 5 7 . 00 1 . 0 0 69
CPAT . 64 . 4 8 - 1 . 7 1 . 57 . 00 1 . 0 0 69
GARAGE . 8 6 . 35 2 . 3 2 . 5 7 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 69
NEIGH (BANK) 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 1.  00 1 . 0 0 69
FIRE 1.  04 . 7 8 . 15 .'57 . 00 3 . 0 0 69
FLORS 1 . 2 7 . 4 5 - . 9 4 . 5 8 1 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 66
TIME 2 . 1 8 1 . 1 9 - 1 . 1 3 . 57 . 0 8 3 .  98 69
AGE 1 4 . 0 3 8 .  62 - . 7 4 . 5 7 1 33 69
PSQFTB 6 4 . 5 1 24 . 7 6 . 5 8 . 5 7 1 2 .  47 1 2 6 . 7 1 69
SQFTB 1 9 9 0 . 5 1 7 7 5 . 5 9 2 . 0 8 . 57 8 7 2 . 0 0 4 9 1 4 . 0 0 69




Variable Mean Std Dev Kurtosis
NEIGH(BANK) . 00 .00
DGAR .01 . 11 77.17
POOL . 11 .31 4.42
HIGHQ . 17 .38 1.12
CARP .20 .40 .28
CPAT .39 .49 -1.82
FIRE .45 .63 8.27
GARAGE .63 .48 -1.70
HUD 1.00 .00 .
NEIGH(HUD) 1.00 .00
FLORS 1.21 .40 .13
TIME 1.92 1.13 -1.41
AGE 18.69 11.19 -.85
PSQFTB 52.58 15.02 -.20
SQFTB 1492.88 565.41 4.34
PRICE 74820.43 24357.30 1.24
BANK FORECLOSURES
Valid
Variable Mean Std Dev Kurtosis
DGAR .00 .00
HUD .00 .00
NEIGH (HUD) .00 .00 .
CARP .05 .23 19.00
POOL .42 .51 -2.11
CPAT .58 .51 -2. 11
HIGHQ .68 .48 -1.42
GARAGE .84 .37 2.41
NEIGH (BANK) 1.00 .00
FIRE 1.26 .81 ! 8 9
FLORS 1.32 .48 -1.42
TIME 2.75 .91 -.94
AGE 14.16 9.23 -.62
PSQFTB 64 .72 17.13 4.34
SQFTB 2189.11 725.69 -.14
PRICE 140242.26 55138.46 -.73
RANDOM SAMPLE
Valid
Variable Mean Std Dev Kurtosis
HUD .00 .00
NEIGH(HUD) .00 .00 .
NEIGH (BANK) .00 .00
DGAR .02 . 15 39. 00
CARP .08 .27 8.00
POOL .17 .38 1. 07
CPAT .46 .50 -1. 98
HIGHQ .48 .50 -2.00
FIRE .77 .67 2. 03
GARAGE .83 . 38 1. 07
FLORS 1.32 .47 -1.41
TIME 1.88 1.08 -1.20
AGE 11.27 11.78 . 69
PSQFTB 64.67 19.82 1.38
SQFTB 1797 . 47 758.56 9. 23
PRICE 113777.89 60757.19 22.29
S.E. Kurt Minimum Maximum N
.00 .00 406
.24 .00 1.00 406
.24 .00 1.00 406
.24 .00 1.00 406
.24 .00 1.00 406
.24 .00 1.00 406
.24 .00 4.00 406
.24 .00 1.00 406
1.00 1.00 406
1.00 1.00 406
.25 1.00 2.00 374
.24 .01 3.67 406
.24 2 50 406
.24 11.72 97.12 406
.24 640.00 3944.00 406
.24 16650.00 180000.00 406




1.01 .00 1.00 19
1.01 .00 1.00 19
1.01 .00 1.00 19
1.01 .00 1.00 19
1.01 .00 1.00 19
1.00 1.00 19
1.01 .00 3.00 19
1.01 1.00 2.00 19
1.01 1.08 3.88 19
1.01 2 33 19
1.01 37.06 117.59 19
1.01 1008.00 3719.00 19
1.01 70000.00 250000.00 19




.19 .00 1.00 655
.19 .00 1.00 655
.19 .00 1.00 655
.19 .00 1.00 655
.19 .00 1.00 655
.19 .00 4.00 655
.19 .00 1.00 655
.19 1.00 2.00 628
,19 .01 3.75 655
.19 1 57 655
.19 8.45 139.45 655
.19 630.00 8235.00 655
.19 13000.00 750000.00 655
FIGURE 1. LAS VEGAS ZIP CODE MAP
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